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Standby Me:
Self-Representation and Standby Counsel in a
Capital Case
Meghan H. Morgan*
John Allen Muhammad ("Muhammad"), the elder of the two suspects
accused of killing ten people in the 2002 "sniper" attacks, shocked a Virginia
Beach courtroom when he announced on Monday, October 20, 2003 that he
wanted to represent himself by proceeding pro se in his capital murder trial.'
Muhammad's defense team assumed the role of standbycounsel and watched as
he made his opening statement and began to outline his innocence to the jury 2
Unable to proceed with their legal defense plan as anticipated, the defense team
was not able to control what information the juryheard. Muhammad's defense
counsel observed somewhat helplessly as Muhammad proceeded.' They pro-
vided assistance onlywhen asked bythe court or Muhammad until two days later
when Muhammad requested representation.'
Muhammad is not the first high-profile defendant to assert his Sixth
Amendment right to self-representation.6 Cohn Ferguson, Ted Bundy, Jack
* J.D. Candidate, May 2005, Washington and Lee University School of Law B.A.,
University of Tennessee at Knoxville, May2002. The author would like to thankProfessor Roger
Groot, Kristen F. Grunewald for her editing and patience, the "journal side" for their aid, assistance
and stress reduction, and the rest of the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse. The author would
also like to thank Andrew Gunnoe, Carmel Morgan, my friends and the rest of my family for their
encouragement and support throughout all aspects of mylife and, most relevant here, law school.
1. Jon Frank & Kate Wiltrout, Mduimd Dfefn Hirad, A 7gang His Oun Gatz Sniper
Sxap's SwpniseMoweBea Day qfD ramr, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Oct. 21, 2003, at Al, amilalieat
2003 WL 60261836.
2. Id
3. See id at A15 (describing the defense counsel sitting next to Muhammad as he made
"bizarre references" to the jury).
4. See id (describing "hushed conversations" that drew protest from the prosecution).
5. US S, rSmpectReinstas La'wm, (Oct. 22,2003), a http://archives.tcnie/breaking
news/2003/10/22/storyl18439.asp (on file with author).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury... and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."); U. S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."). The Sixth Amendment right to self-representation was
made applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Sw Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 807 (1975) (stating that a state may not constitutionally hale a person into criminal court and
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Kevorkian, and Zacarias Moussaoui all chose to represent themselves in their
respective trials.7 As illustrated byeach of these cases, pro se defendants often
face considerable obstacles in their attempts to provide themselves an adequate
legal defense.'
The stakes for a capital defendant proceeding pro se are high, and the
decisions that such a defendant makes in this capacitytrulycan mean the differ-
ence between life and death. The issues that surround self-representation are
amplified in the context of a capital murder trial because subjects that should be
preserved for appeal can easilybe procedurallydefaulted bya defendant with no
legal training.9 Additional questions also emerge. Should defendants acting as
their own defense attorneys be able to forgo the presentation of mitigating
evidence at sentencing and pursue death? What is the role of standby counsel
during the guilt/innocence and sentencing phases of a capital trial? This Article
will examine the historyof self-representation, the emergence of standbycoun-
sel, and the issues that surround the role of standby counsel today. Further, this
Article will identify areas in the capital context in which the role of standby
counsel should be explored and peras be expanded in the interest of judicial
integrity.
I. Ewhdiom qf th Phmnw cfStairiY Caaztd
"In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their
own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively,
are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein."10 This statutory pro-
nouncement is the current codification of section 35 of the Judiciary Act of
then require him to use a lawyer when the defendant insisted on conducting his own defense).
7. Amy Jeter, Risks A e Ma Ar /ps& Few W1n Doniaz Aa sz AmwrS, ThE
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Oct. 21, 2003, at Al, auiie at 2003 WL 60261838 (caption reprinted from
Associated Press). Not all of these defendants were capital defendants. Id Colin Ferguson was
convicted of the 1993 shooting that killed six passengers on a New York commuter train. Id Ted
Bundy was a serial killer who was found guilty and executed. Id Jack Kevorkian was the "mercy
killer" convicted bya juyof second degree murder for the aid he provided in the intentional suicide
of an elderly and sick man- Id Zacarias Moussaoui is being tried as a co-conspirator in the
September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center. Id
8. Se Marie Higgins Williams, 7w P- sc,i,,iDin a, St& c ma d *J A
Pni~aIFrBetter- D iRo, 71 U. COLa. L. REV. 789, 789-792 (2000) (describing events that
occurred in the trials of Dr. Jack Kevorkian, Theodore KaczysKi, and Coin Ferguson).
9. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977) (holding that the respondent's failure to
assert timely an objection under Florida's contemporaneous objection rule, absent a showing of
good cause for non-compliance, precludes federal habeas corpus review of the respondent's claim).
See 4Matthew K. Mahoney, Bn g thePrm aulDWandt Chz 12 CAP. DEF. J. 305 (2000)
(advising Virginia capital defense attorneys on issues relating to procedural default and preservation
of appellate and habeas issues).
10. 28 US.C S 1654 (2000).
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1789, which was enacted the day before the Sixth Amendment was proposed."
The statute calls attention to the fact that since our nation's beginning, the right
to represent oneself in a federal court has been protected. 2 Two United States
Supreme Court cases have examined the constitutionality of the right to self-
representation and the rules governing the role of standby counsel.
A. Faretta v. California
The Sixth Amendment provides for the accused to have "Assistance of
Counsel for his defence."13 It is well established that the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments provide a person charged with a crime in either federal or state
court the right to counsel; however, the question raised in Fan=tta v Ca7ia4
was "[w]hether the Constitution forbids a State from forcing a lawyer upon a
defendant."" The United States Supreme Court held that making counsel
available to all defendants is one thing but it is "quite another to say that a State
may compel a defendant to accept a lawyer he does not want." 16
The Court based its decision in Fan= on the structure of the Sixth Amend-
ment, the history from which the Amendment emerged, and the idea of individ-
ual autonomy implicit in the personal rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment. 7 Because the Sixth Amendment states that "the accused shall enjoythe
right.. .to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence," the Court concluded
that "[although not stated in the Amendment in so many words, the right to
self-representation- to make one's own defense personally- is thus necessarily
implied bythe structure of the Amendment." 8 Further, the Court explained that
11. Fantta, 422 U.S. at 812-13; 1 Stat. 73,92 (1789);seU.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating "[in
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right toafspeedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury.. and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his deence").
12. Fana, 422 U.S. at 812.
13. US. CORNT. amend VI.
14. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
15. Farma, 422 U.S. at 815;seeGideonv. Wainwright, 372 US. 335,341-42 (1963) (holding
that the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel provision applies to the states). Faretta was arrested
and charged with grand theft. Fanam, 422 US. at 807. He was arraigned and a public defender was
appointed to represent him. Id Well before trial, Faretta, who had represented himself in a criminal
trial previously and was worried about the public defender's heavy workload, requested the judge
to allow him to proceed pro se. l The judge preliminarily granted the request but, before trial,
conducted a hearing and changed his mind declaring that Faretta's waiver of assistance of counsel
was not knowing and voluntary. Id at 808-10. The judge ruled that he was not allowed to conduct
his own defense. Id at 810. Faretta repeatedly requested that he be appointed as co-counsel and
attempted to make motions on his own behalf. Id Faretta was convicted and sentenced to prison.
Id at 811.
16. Farnna, 422 US. at 833.
17. Id at 818-21.
18. Id at 819.
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the structure of the phrase" 'assistance' of counsel" means purelythat, a lawyer,
no matter howknowedgeable, is his client's assistant. 9 "To thrust counsel upon
the accused, against his considered wish, thus violates the logic of the Amend-
ment" and results in counsel being seen as a master." The Court pointed to a
long history of British and colonial jurisprudence that exemplified the idea that
self-representation for serious crimes was commonplace.2'
The Court acknowledged that the right to self-representation was not
without limitation.22 Recognizing that there could be situations in which an
accused is incapable of understanding the benefits that accompany having legal
aid and representation, the Court reiterated that the accused must competently
and intelligentlyestablish that he contemplated the danger of self-representation
and that he understood his choice to represent himself and its possible implica-
tions."
The United States Supreme Court held in Gainz u Mora2 4 that the compe-
tencystandard for waiving one's right to counsel is the same standard of compe-
tency as that required in order to stand trial.2" This standard requires that the
court determine "whether [the defendant] has sufficient present abilityto consult
19. Id at 820. The Court further stated, "[tihe language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment
contemplate that counsel ... shall be an aid to a willing defendant- not an organ of the State
interposed between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally." Id
20. Id
21. Id at 821-23, 826. The Court found only one instance in British legal history of a court
"forcing counsel upon an unwilling defendant in a criminal proceeding" and no instances of such
a practice in American colonial history. Id at 821, 827-28.
22. SeFanat, 422 U.S. at 833 n.46 ("The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse
the dignityof the courtroom. Neither is it a license not to complywith relevant rules of procedural
and substantive law."). S&,&rafy Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970) (articulating that
the court can, after warning the pro se defendant, terminate the defendant's right to self-representa-
tion for engaging in courtroom misconduct).
23. Famta, 422 U.S. at 835; seJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938) (stating that"(t]he
determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend,
in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the
background, experience, and conduct of the accused"); Adams v. United States ex reL McCann, 317
U.S. 269, 279 (1942) ("But the Constitution does not force a lawyer upon a defendant. He may
waive his Constitutional right to assistance of counsel if he knows what he is doing and his choice
is made with eyes open.").
24. 509 U.S. 388 (1993).
25. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 388, 391 (1993); see Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402,
402 (1960) (per curiam) (stating the test for competency to stand triaD. In Godin, the defendant
pleaded not guilty to three counts of first degree murder and then, after the State announced its
intent to seek death, cane before the court requesting to proceed pro se and to change his initial
plea to guilty. Gcria, 509 U.S. at 392. On the basis of psychiatric exams performed previously,
the court concluded that the defendant was competent and that he knowingly and intelligently
waived his right to counsel Id During the petitioner's habeas proceedings, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the competency standard to waive his right to counsel
should be higher than the competency standard to stand trial. Id at 394.
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with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding- and whether
[the defendant] has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him."26 Once it is determined that the accused is competent to waive his
right to counsel, the court is required to conduct a second inquiryto ensure that
he has made this decision knowingly and intelligently. 7 According to the Court
in Farm, this inquiry should not focus on the defendant's skill or mastery of the
legal issue for which he stands accused, but rather the inquiry should focus on
whether the defendant understands the implications of his waiver of the right to
counseL2
In response to concerns that pro se defendants would deliberately disrupt
their trials, the Court in Famtta stated that such instances, since the beginning of
federal law, had been rare.29 Moreover, if a defendant deliberately engages in
conduct that disrupts or obstructs the course of the trial, a trial judge can termi-
nate the defendant's abilityto represent himself." While recognizing the defen-
dant's right to proceed pro se, the Court noted that the defendant must comply
with the substantive rules that govern trials." The Court went further and
stated, "[o]f course, a State may-- even over objection bythe accused- appoint
a'standbycounsel' to aid the accused if and when the accused requests help, and
to be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of the
defendant's self-representation is necessary."32
26. Dky, 362 U.S. at 402. This standard is often referred to as the "rationalunderstanding"
standard. Godirz, 509 U.S. at 397.
27. SweAdari, 317 US. at 275 (stating that "an accused, in the exercise of a free and
intelligent choice, and with the considered approval of the court, may waive trial by jury, and so
likewise may he competently and intelligently waive his Constitutional right to assistance of coun-
sel").
28. Fa, 422 U.S. at 835.
29. Id at 834 n.46.
30. Id; si United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1124 (D.C Cir. 1972) ("The right to
self-representation, though asserted before trial, can be lost by disruptive behavior during trial,
constituting constructive waiver."); A/#a, 397 U.S. at 343 (hokling that a defendant can lose his right
to be present at his own trial as guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment if he is warned bythe judge
that he will be removed for disruptive behavior and then continues to conduct "himself in a manner
so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him
in the courtroom").
31. FanUta, 422 U.S. at 835 n.46 ("The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse
the dignityof the courtroom. Neither is it a license not to complywith relevant rules of procedural
and substantive law.").
32. Id; seDcieK 473 F.2d at 1124-25 (explaining that, because of a pro se defendant's
"rudimentary acquaintanceship with the rules of evidence and courtroom protocol," the trial judge
can appoint "amicus curiae to assist the defendant"); United States v. Spencer, 439 F.2d 1047,1051
(2d CGr. 1971) (stating the court's suggestion "that the district courts ... offer as an alternative to
an indigent defendant who wishes to proceed pro se the assistance of appointed counsel available
as a resource to the extent that the defendant maywish to make use of his services").
20041
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The dissent in Famta voiced opposition to the majority opinion for several
reasons. Most notably in the context of this Article, the dissenting justices
suggested that the majority's decision undermined an "already malfunctioning
criminal justice system."33 The dissenting justices stated, "[t]hat goal [of ensuring
justice] is ill-served, and the integrity of and public confidence in the system are
undermined, when an easy conviction is obtained due to the defendant's ill-
advised decision to waive counsel."34 The justice system's role, according to the
dissenting justices, is to ensure fair trials for both the defendant and for the
benefit of society." These concerns for the integrity of the judicial system re-
emerge in a heightened sense when one considers an ill-prepared defendant
representing himself against the State in a struggle over life and death.
B. McKaskle v. Wiggins
In McKaskle v W ti 6 the Supreme Court considered the constitutional
role and the limitations of standby counsel.37 Carl Edwin Wiggins ("Wggins")
exercised his Sixth Amendment right to proceed pro se with his defense in a
robbery trial.3 Due to an indictment error, his first conviction was set aside.39
Wiggins was subsequentlytried again and convicted." The trial court appointed
standby counsel to assist him in both of his trials.4 Wiggins requested that
standbycounsel not interfere with his presentation of the case, but he constantly
interrupted his own examinations to confer with standby counsel and standby
counsel conducted voir dire.42 On appeal, Wiggins challenged his standby
counsel's involvement in his second trial and claimed "they had unfairly inter-
fered with his presentation of his defense" in violation of his constitutionally
protected right.43
After several failed appeals, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Crcuit reversed the denial of Wiggin's habeas petition and held that, due to the
33. Faraa, 422 U.S. at 837 (Burger, J., dissenting).
34. Id at 839 (Burger, J., dissenting).
35. Id at 840 (Burger, J., dissenting).
36. 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
37. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 US. 168, 170 (1984).
38. Idat 170.
39. Id
40. Id McKaskle was sentenced to life imprisonment at both trials because of his status as
a recidivist. Id
41. Id
42. Id at 172. SeeggndyJosephA. Colquitt, HbridRepnuiativ StandiezTuSidaiCDin
on its Ed 38 WAKE FORESTL.REV. 55 (2003) (discussing the implications of standbycounsel and
the pro se defendant both being active participants in front of the jury in a criminal tria]).
43. Mdcasklk 465 US. at 170, 173; seeFanta, 422 US. at 807 (recognizing a Sixth Amend-
ment right to conduct one's own defense).
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unrequested aid by standby counsel during trial, Wiggins had been denied his
Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. 4 The Fifth Circuit discussed the
role of standbycounsel and noted that they should " 'be seen, but not heard.' ,4
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit.46
The Court stated that to determine if Fameta rights had been honored, "the
primaryfocus must be on whether the defendant had a fair chance to present his
case in his own way."4" The Court outlined a two-part test to determine if
standbycounsel's unsolicited actions interfered with a defendant's Fareta rights."
First, the pro se defendant must be able to control the case and how it is pre-
sented to the jury.49 Second, standbycounsel's participation should not interfere
with the jury's perception of the defendant representing himself.50 Implicit in
this two-part standard is the idea of autonomy of the individual. If a defendant
elects to proceed pro se and has competently, voluntarily, and knowinglywaived
his right to counsel, then standby counsel should not be a hindrance to the case
the defendant wishes to put forward."' "If standby counsel's participation over
the defendant's objection effectively allows counsel to make or substantially
interfere with any significant tactical decisions, or to control the questioning of
witnesses, or to speak intazdof the defendant on any matter of importance, the
Faretta right is eroded." 2 According to the Court, a pro se defendant should be
allowed to address the court on his own behalf and, if standbycounsel disagrees,
the conflict should be resolved in the defendant's favor.5 3
Outside the presence of the jury, standby counsel are given more flexibility
regarding the level of their involvement.'" Conflicts between a pro se defendant
and standby counsel can be addressed before the judge where each party can
address the court freely, so long as the matter is one that would normallybe left
to counsel's discretion, it is resolved in the defendant's favor."5 This process
44. M'askle, 465 US. at 173.
45. Id (quoting Wiggins v. EsteUe, 681 F.2d 266, 273 (5th CAr. 1982) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
46. Id
47. Id at 177.
48. Id at 178.
49. Id
50. MdCaskk, 465 U.S. at 178.
51. Sw id at 177 (stating that Fawtaplaces some limitations on standbycounsel's unsolicited
participation).
52. Id at 178.
53. Id at 179.
54. Seeid at 178 (stating that participation bystandbycounsel outside the presence of the jury
does not destroy the jury's perception of the defendant's control over his own trial.
55. Id at 179; gr AMERICAN BAR ASSOaATION STANDARDS FOR CRMINAL JtSTICE:
STANDBY COUNSEL FOR PRO SE DEFENDANT, Standard 6-3.7 (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter ABA
2004]
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does not diminish the appearance of the defendant's control to the jury. Like-
wise, standby counsel does not violate Famtta rights when assisting a pro se
defendant in conquering basic "procedural or evidentiary obstacles to the
completion of some specific task, such as introducing evidence or objecting to
testimony" if the defendant clearly expresses the wish for aid. 6
IlI Pnxadig Pro Se
A. AssertingtheRig
The courts do not have an obligation at the beginning of a trial to inform
a defendant of his constitutional right to proceed pro se."7 However, once a
defendant asserts this right, courts are required to ensure that the assertion is
competently and intelligently made. 8 After the court determines that the
defendant is competent, a key question then becomes when a court may deter-
mine that a defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive this right.
Generally speaking, a court must make the defendant aware of the dangers and
potential disadvantages of self-representation and must satisfy itself that the
defendant made the decision to proceed pro se voluntarily. 9 In making this
Standard 6-3.7] (stating that when a defendant is permitted to proceed without counsel, the trial
judge should consider the appointment of standbycounsel to assist the defendant when requested).
Additionally, the ABA recommends that standby counsel be appointed in every capital case. Id
The guidelines further state that:
When standby counsel is appointed to provide assistance to the pro se accused only
when requested the trial judge should ensure that counsel not actively participate in
the conduct of tie defense uMlless requested by the accused or directed to do so by the
court. When standbycounselis appointed to activelyassist the pro se accused, the trial
judge should ensure that the accused is permitted to make the final decisions on all
matters, including strategic and tactical matters relating to the conduct of the case.
Id
56. McKaskle 465 U.S. at 183. Aid by standby counsel in this respect does not erode the
defendant's actual control over the direction of the trial, nor does it threaten to impair severely the
jury's perception of the defendant's representative status. Id
57. S&Munkus v. Furlong, 170 F.3d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that "because, 'the
right to self-representation does not implicate constitutional fair trial considerations to the same
extent as does an accused's right to counsel,' it requires neither notice of the right's existence prior
to legal proceedings nor a knowing and intelligent waiver" (quoting United States v. Martin, 25 F.3d
293, 295 (6th Cir. 1994))).
58. SwCkd w, 509 U.S. at 396 (enunciating that the court must determine competency and
that the waiver of the constitutional right to counsel is made knowingly and voluntarily).
59. Fargta, 422 U.S. at 835 (stating "[the defendant] should be made aware of the dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that 'he knows what he
is doing and his choice is made with eyes open' "(quoting Adat, 317 U.S. at 279)); seeaso Wise v.
Bowersox, 136 F.3d 1197, 1203 (8th Gir. 1998) (holding that the defendant in a capital murder trial
did knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel because the record reflected that not only
did he sayhis waiver was knowing and voluntarybut the court questioned him "at length about the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation"); q. Van Sant v. Gondles, 596 F. Supp. 484,489
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determination, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
stated that the court should "entertain everyreasonable presumption against the
waiver of this fundamental constitutional right."60 Some courts require a written
waiver of the right to counsel, while others merely require that the record reflect
the free choice of the defendant. 1
B. Wziatior and Lin on tle Rigbt to Sdf Repmentation
When a defendant asserts and is granted the right to proceed pro se, Fawta
and McKaskle make it clear that the pro se defendant controls the organization
and content of his defense. 2 Implicit in this determination is the finding that the
defendant can make motions to the court on his own behalf, argue points of law
and fact to both the judge and the jury, participate fully in voir dire, and address
the court and jury directly. Of course, the defendant's demeanor must not stray
outside appropriate courtroom etiquette nor may he disregard courtroom
protocols and procedures .61 The court mayappoint standbycounsel to assist the
pro se defendant but is not required to do so."4 Additionally, it is not reversible
(E.D. Va. 1983) (stating that the trial judge's failure to inform the defendant about the hazards of
pro se defense and failure to inquire about whether this choice was voluntarily made constituted
error that deprived the defendant of his Sixth Amendment rights). Courts have suggested impor-
tant Fareta considerations for the defendant including:
(1) that "presenting a defense is not a simple matter of tellng one's story," but requires
adherence to various "technicalrules" governing the conduct of a trial; (2) that a lawyer
has substantial experience and t in trial pocedure and that the prosecution will
be represented by an experienced attorey (3) that a person unfamiliar with legal
procedures may allow the prosecutor an advantage by fai g to make objections to
inadmissible evidence, may not make effective use of such rights as the voir dire of
jurors, and maymake tactical decisions that produce unintendedconsequences; (4) that
a defendant proceeding pro se will not be allowed to complain on appeal about the
competency of his representation; and (5) "that the effectiveness of Uis defense may
wellbe diminished by his dual role as attorney and accused."
State v. Van Sickle, 411 N.W.2d 665,666-67 (S.D. 1987) (quoting R LaFa, Criminal Procedure,
5 11.5 (1984)).
60. United States v. Johnson, 659 F.2d 415, 416 (4th Cr. 1981) (citing Zerit, 304 U.S. at
464).
61. See, eg., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-160 (Mchie 2000) (stating that if the court determines
the accused voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to counsel, then a statement shall be
executed to document his waiver and that statement will then be a part of the record).
62. Famta, 422 U.S. at 836; Mdraukle, 465 U.S. at 177.
63. S&Mdcaskle, 465 U.S. at 178 (stating that the defendant has a right to appear before the
juryand present his own defense on his own behalf); Fana, 422 US. at 834 n.46 (stating that a trial
judge can terminate a pro se defendant's right to self-representation if the defendant engages in
disruptive and obstructionist conduct).
64. Farem., 422 U.S. at 834 n.46 (citing Do#eny, 473 F.2d at 1125); se United States v.
Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1096 (4th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the pro se defendant's assertion that the
court was required to appoint standby counsel to aid with the presentation of his defense); Spm-r,
439 F.2d at 1051 (advocating that trial courts appoint standbycounsel when defendants choose to
2004]
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error for a judge to decline to appoint standbycounsel. s Further, courts possess
the abilityto terminate the defendant's right to self-representation in the interest
of judicial integrityand judicial economyif the defendant's conduct undulydelays
or obstructs the trial.
66
If a pro se defendant with standby counsel abandons his right to self-
representation, or the court takes this right away, then standby counsel assumes
the role of defense counsel. A pro se defendant is unlikelyto succeed in assert-
ing ineffective assistance of counsel for either his own involvement in his
defense or the aid that standbycounsel provided or failed to provide.67 Because
of the foggyconstitutional status of standbycounsel, "[tihe courts have difficulty
accepting the proposition that a defendant who has no constitutional right to the
assistance of standbycounsel can complain if that assistance, granted bythe trial
court as a discretionary act, fails to meet some minimum standard."6"
IV. Role cStafz9JyCvm
A. Wh7yDo We NeeStanr4by Casd?
A capital murder trial best illustrates the need for standby counsel because
the stakes are so high. When courts fail to appoint standby counsel in capital
cases, the integrityof the judicial system is more vulnerable to attack. The public
will question the "justness" of verdicts rendered in cases in which a defendant,
unschooled in the intricacies of the law or courtroom protocol, is sentenced to
death.69 The courts now face the problem of defining a more specific role for
standby counsel in capital cases. In order to avoid the public viewing the crimi-
nal justice system as no longer just and impartial, the defendant's right to self-
representation and the need for judicial integritymust be balanced.'0 The current
lack of standards illuminates the fact that standby counsel is not constitutionally
proceed pro se).
65. Because there is no constitutional right to standby counsel and the appointment of
standbycounsel is discretionary, it is implicit that one cannot claim reversible error if counselis not
appointed. Se eg, State v. Small, 988 S.W.2d 671,673-75 (stating that a pro se defendant does not
have a constitutional right to the appointment of standby counsel.
66. Farnza, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46.
67. SwMdcaskle, 465 U.S. at 177 n.8 (stating that a pro se defendant cannot claim ineffective
assistance of counsel for the inadequacy of his own representation).
68. AnnPoulin, TheRoe jStadby Camd in Cririml Css: Inte Tuiuigbt Zne jqte Cri:nl
JustieS)ttert 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 679, 726 (2000).
69. See Wflliams, s"pra note 8, at 805 (stating that "the most compelling justification for the
practice of appointing standby counsel is that the defendant generally has not received a legal
education").
70. Se id at 789 (offering commentary and proposed guidelines to define more clearly the
roles of a pro se defendant, standby counsel and the judicial interests at stake in a criminal trial.
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required; rather, appointment is discretionary and most court decisions allow a
trial court to refuse to appoint standby counsel. 1
Some commentators argue that the appointment of standbycounsel should
be compulsory in capital murder trials.72 Mandatory appointment of standby
counsel would serve the overarching policy of judicial efficiency because a
trained defense attomeycould step inimmediatelyupon a defendant's relinquish-
ment of his right to self-representation. Standbycounsel could carryon the trial
with minimal delay. Additionally, mandatory appointment of standby counsel
could, depending on the level of preparedness required of them, help the courts
legitimatize jury verdicts to the public. In order to focus properly on the level
of interaction and limitations imposed on standby counsel, the courts need to
determine what role and what level of involvement standby counsel will be
permitted to assume in the criminal trial.
B. Modes cf Stanby Cwel
There are three different models that represent the roles and limitations
courts have placed on standby counsel. 3 These models range from having
standby counsel literallyjust stand byin case the pro se defendant loses his right
to continue to represent himself, to having standby counsel serve as a resource,
to having co- or "hybrid" representation in which the defendant and standby
counsel both actively participate during all stages of the criminal trial. 4 The
multiplicityof acceptable practices not onlyconfuses judges, defendants, standby
counsel, and juries but ultimately results in unfairness with respect to how
individual defendants are treated. A uniform system and a defined role for
standby counsel should be articulated, and the role and limitations should be
understood not onlybythe attomeyassigned as standbycounsel but also bythe
defendant asserting his right to proceed pro se.
1. Idle
Courts could advocate that standby counsel maintain a very passive role,
assuming trial obligations onlywhen the defendant relinquishes his right to self-
representation or when the court no longer allows the defendant to represent
71. Poulin, supra note 68, at 68;se eg, McQueen v. Blackburn, 755 F.2d 1174,1178 (5th Cr.
1985) (concluding that the appointment of standby counsel is not mandatory); Srma 988 S.W.2d
at 673-75 (stating that a pro se defendant does not have a constitutional right to the appointment
of standby counsel.
72. SeeWilliams, sup note 8, at 809- 812 (advocating the mandatoryappointment of standby
by counsel when criminal defendants choose to exercise their Sixth Amendment rights).
73. See Poulin, spr note 68, at 707-08 (discussing the three established roles of standby
counsel); John H Pearson, MaraoyA d GsoyCozdforPmSeD0 t: Maim Fanzs in the
Crrinin Tra, 72 CAL. L. REV. 697, 713 (1984) (discussing three different views of standbycounsel).
74. Poulin, supra note 68, at 708-09.
2004]
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
himself."5 It can be argued that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to self-
representation is best protected by this model because the defendant likely will
not be interrupted or have an attorney affect the jury's perception of the defen-
dant being in control of his own defense. However, having standbycounsel play
such an idle role could encourage laziness and potentially have a debilitating
effect on the defendant's criminal trial. Should idle standbycounsel assume the
role of defense attorney, trial delay would most certainly occur. One of the
justifications for appointing standbycounsel is to minimize trial delayshould the
pro se defendant not be allowed or not wish to continue in such a capacity.
Maintaining standby counsel that has not been encouraged to follow the defen-
dant's trial strategy and prepare daily as if he were going to take over nullifies that
justification.
2. Hybrid
Hybrid representation has been referred to as co-counsel and results when
both the pro se defendant and standbycounsel actively and concurrentlypartici-
pate in all aspects of the criminal trial.76 While some courts and scholars have
endorsed this practice, it has met equal opposition.77 Those that endorse hybrid
representation argue, among other things, that the jury is presented with a
humanized pro se defendant who would otherwise not have taken the stand."
For Virginia practitioners trying federal cases it is important to recognize that the
Fourth Circuit has not made a distinction between hybrid counsel and standby
counsel.7 9 Those that oppose hybrid representation urge pro se defendants and
standbycounsel to be aware that this type of representation has the potential of
confusing the jury. Jurors do not always understand that a defendant has the
right to proceed pro se, and could find it confusing that an attorney and the
defendant himself are jointly presenting different parts of the defense case."
Additionally, a judge could be uncertain about the level of involvement that
standbycounsel should have and, being acutelyaware that too much interference
could result in the perception on appeal that the defendant's Famtta rights were
unconstitutionally infringed, the trial judge may not allow standby counsel to
75. 14 at 707-08.
76. Sw gaouIy Colquitt, su"r note 42, at 75-115 (advocating that courts refrain from
allowing hybrid representation).
77. Qmv, rd, at 75-115, uith Joshua L. Howard, H* id Repme aona Standby Cm d"
Let's CrtheAirfortheA wnor q'fSa Ca w 52 S.C. L. REv. 851, 857-65 (2001) (advocating
the use of hybrid representation in South Carolina after exploring its benefits and detriments).
78. Howard, s"ep'a note 77, at 862-63.
79. S&Si, 'ar 107 F.3d at 1097 n.2 (noting that because the type of assistance the defen-
dant requested was unclear, and because the court did not believe that advisory counsel's participa-
tion was significant, the court decided to use "advisory counsel," "standby counsel," and "hybrid
representation" synonymously).
80. Williams, supra note 8, at 808.
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appear to be aiding the defendant at all." To add confusion to the myriad of
issues standby counsel faces, "[s]ome courts have held that, as soon as the
defendant requests the assistance of standby counsel, he has relinquished his
waiver of counsel and has waived his right to self-representation completely."82
Conflicting case law on the amount of aid standby counsel can provide illumi-
nates the need for a more unified standard to serve as guidance.
3. A tthe Ready
"At the ready' standbycounsel prepares for each dayof trial as if it was the
last day the pro se defendant would be able to represent himself.83 In this
situation, standby counsel serves as a resource to the pro se defendant and can
change trial strategy based on the defendant's daily actions. Standby counsel
would be available to answer questions for the pro se defendant, aid in success-
fully hurdling routine procedural barriers, and argue motions outside the pres-
ence of the jury. Bypreparing daily for the chance that the defendant's right to
self-representation might end, judicial economyis saved as standby counsel can
easilyand efficientlycontinue the defendant's representation. Counsel appointed
to "stand by in this manner could see this model of representation as too
demanding. It is likelythat complaints would be made that, in practice, there is
no lowered obligation to being appointed standbycounsel. All counsel, standby,
appointed, or retained, should serve their clients zealously and should, more
broadly speaking, work to assure proper judicial resolution of matters before the
court. By adopting the "at the ready model, attorneys, the courts, pro se
defendants, and societyin general would be best served.
V. Pro Se Df ants in & Capil Contrxt
In 1976 the United States Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty after
upholding new procedural safeguards that were meant to avoid its arbitrary
imposition.84 These safeguards were intended to narrow the class of defendants
81. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 177-78.
82. Williams, s"pra note 8, at 808 (citing Smith v. State, 588 A-2d 305, 306 (Me. 1991)); see
Snith, 588 A.2d at 306 (noting that during plea negotiations the defendant requested assistance from
standby counsel and his right to self-representation was considered waived).
83. Poulin, supra note 68, at 707-08, 725.
84. See Eric Rieder, TheRighbtqSdfRPmrradionindthe pia Case 85 COLUM.L.REv. 130,
132-33 (1985) (describing the attributes of a constitutional sentencing scheme in the wake of
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality
opinion)). The United States Supreme Court held in Fumum that the death penalty, under the
Georgia capital sentencing procedures that existed at the time, violated the Eighth Amendment.
Funnin 408 U.S. at 240. In GrmM the Court stated that:
[Tlhe concerns expressed in Fwumn that the penalty of death not be osed in an
arbitrary or capncious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures
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for whom the death penalty was applicable and to ensure that individualized
determinations on sentencing were made after considering the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances in each case. 5 Because of the finality of death, the
court should equip the jurywith the facts, circumstances, and mitigating evidence
to guide its decision-making. 6
In Faretta, a non-capital case, the Court stated that the voluntary and
knowing waiver of the right to counsel in advance of trial in order to proceed
pro se was constitutionally protected.87 In People v B/Mon" the Supreme Court
of California was confronted with a capital case in which a defendant, after the
conclusion of the guilt/innocence phase, was allowed to proceed pro se through
the penalty phase. 9 Despite the advice of his trial counsel, the defendant
announced that he preferred a verdict of death.' On appeal from his death
verdict, the defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion in granting
his midtrial motion to proceed pro se.91 The Supreme Court of California denied
the defendant's appeal and stated that "it would be incongruous to hold that a
trial court lacked power to grant a midtrial motion for self-representation in a
capital case merely because the accused stated an intention to seek a death
verdict."92 Further, the court reasoned that if a capital defendant was able to
proceed pro se and the death penaltywas thus unavailable because the defendant
chose not to pursue mitigating evidence, there would be no effective way to
compel the defendant to make an affirmative death penalty defense.93
B/oomillustrates the issue of whether a pro se defendant seeking the death
penalty meets the competency standard. Boxn also illustrates the precarious
position of standby counsel once their control over a capital case is relinquished
that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance. As a general
proposition these concerns are best met by a system that provides for a bifircated
proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant
to the im-osition of sentence and'provided with standards to guide its use of the
information.
GnX 428 U.s. at 195 (plurality opinion).
85. Gnt 428 U.S. at 195 (plurality opinion).
86. Id
87. Fannt 422 U.S. at 819.
88. 774 P.2d 698 (Cal. 1989).
89. People v. Bloom, 774 P.2d 698, 712-13 (Cal. 1989).
90. Id
91. Id at 713.
92. Id at 715.
93. Id at 716. SwmndyHamblenv. State, 527So. 2d 800,804 (Fla. 1988) (holding that "all
competent defendants have a right to control their own destinies" even if they are capital defen-
dants who wish not to present mitigating evidence or argue against death). For a more complete
discussion of Virginia cases dealing with capital defendants who affirmatively seek death, see Ross
E. Eisenberg, 7h Lau)Ws Rde W1=e d jei? Sades Daab, 14 CAP. DEF. J. 55 (2001).
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to the defendant before the presentation of mitigating evidence.' If society has
an interest in a death verdict being reliable and "just," then a minimal additional
procedural safeguard should be put in place. Courts should be required to
conduct mental evaluations of death-seeking defendants before the time for
presentation of mitigating evidence. Such a safeguard would ensure that even if
a court had earlier found the defendant to be competent to waive his right to
counsel and proceed on his own, his mental health had not deteriorated into
incompetency over the course of the trial.
The dissent in B/o"nfound that a capital defendant's abilityaffirmativelyto
seek death "subvert[ed] the process and thereby undermine[d] the reliability of
its result."" According to the dissenting justice, Fawita was not intended to be
a sword for use bythe pro se defendant but rather a shield to defend himself and
the integrity of the judicial system.96 According to the dissent, the majority, by
granting the defendant's request, dismantled the reliability of the system and
allowed a defendant effectively to prosecute himself.
A. Vr Dire
Capital cases are different from other criminal cases in two important ways.
Each difference illustrates an area in which standby counsel's presence would
make a difference. First, in the capital context voir dire takes on added signifi-
cance. One "life-juror" can make the difference between a life and a death
sentence because a jury must unanimously reach a verdict in order for death to
be imposed." Having a firm grasp on the law surrounding voir dire is essential
to ensure that the juryis properlychosen and free from bias. If a capital defen-
dant requests and is granted pro se status and standby counsel are appointed
before voir dire takes place, then the defendant's failure to utilize standbycoun-
sel's aid in picking a jury could literally prove fatal. Additionally, a trial court's
failure to appoint standby counsel, which would leave the pro se defendant
without anyform of legal assistance, could prove equally as fatal.
Because of the significance of voir dire, it arguably constitutes the most
important component of a capital murder trial. Substantial law, both federal and
94. Sewe aidyRichard J. Bonnie, 7zDo*qt c b C 74 VA.L.REV. 1363 (1988)
(analyzing the precarious situation counsel is put in when a capital defendant expresses a preference
r execution).
95. Bkau, 774 P.2d at 726 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
96. Id at 727 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting in part). Justice Mosk pointed to the fact
that the motion to proceed pro se was made "shortly before the opening of the penaltyphase,-
which was certainly too late for the majority to rely on Famu for controlling guidance. Id
97. S eg, FED. R. QIvL P. 3 1(a) (stating that "[t]he jusy must return its verdict to a judge
in open court" and "[t]he verdict must be unanimous"); VA. SUP. Cr. R. 3A.17(a) (Michie 2004)
(stating that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the verdict shall be unanimous, in writing and signed by
the foreman, and returned by the jury in open court").
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state, surrounds the determination of who can serve on a jury, and a pro se
defendant's failure to recognize potential juror eligibility issues and call the
court's attention to them can prove fatal to a capital defendant.98 The Sixth
Amendment grants the criminally accused the right to "an impartial jury."99
Additionally, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments maybe implicated when
a jury is improperly seated."re The Eighth Amendment, applied to the states
through the Fourteenth, protects the accused from cruel and unusual punish-
ment; this protection includes safeguards against death verdicts rendered by
biased juries.'
A potential capital juror must be able to consider both the possibility of a
life sentence and a death sentence. 2 A voir dire inquiry, therefore, is at its most
basic an inquiry into the life/death impartiality of potential jurymembers. The
Supreme Court of the United States inMorlnv Illiis °3 stated that clearlyunder
the standard set forth in Wainw'iX v Wru' "a juror who in no case would vote
for capital punishment, regardless of his or her instructions, is not an impartial
juror and must be removed for cause."0 5 Similarly, the court in Mogn held that
jurors who automatically will vote for death in every case fail to consider the
evidence of aggravation and mitigation as the jury instructions require."° Be-
98. Sw Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992) (allowing the defense to exclude jurors
if theywould automaticallyvote for death); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,89(1986) (holding that
the Equal Protection Clause forbids racially motivated use of peremptory strikes); Wainwright v.
Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 420 (1985) (allowing the state to exclude jurors whose views will" 'pwwr or
sulstaniay ir dtepqfmx qf bz dki as a jawv inaankmeh his u iom m a si his
oath "(alteration in original (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)); Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968) (holding that a juror who makes "unmistakably clear" that
he or she will "automatically vote against" death is excludable for cause).
99. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
100. The Eighth Amendment provides a protection from inappropriate death sentences that
could result from a biased jury. Such a death sentence could be considered "cruel and unusual
punishment." S&-US. CONST. amend. VIII (stating that "[ejxcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted").
101. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (stating that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
(stating in part "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law"). See grra/!y Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (applying the Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment).
102. See eg, W'/dxspon 391 U.S. at 522-23 (illustrating that the jury cannot be organized so
that the State can rely on it to return a verdict of death).
103. 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
104. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
105. Moran, 504 US. at 728; sw Waiundt4 469 U.S. at 420 (stating that the state can exclude
a juror if the juror's views will" 'ptmwr orsuwsantially mpair the pefonm of his daie s a jtwt m
aamniamr uith hs imtms and his aW' "(alteration in original (quoting Adim, 448 U.S. at 45)).
106. Morivr 504 U.S. at 729.
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cause of the juror's pre-determined opinion, the absence or presence of mitigat-
ing evidence becomes irrelevant." 7 Due to the constitutional guarantee of the
right to an impartial jury, a capital defendant is able to "challenge for cause any
prospective juror who maintains such views. '" ' A pro se defendant who chose
not to utilize the assistance of appointed standbycounsel, or for whom standby
counsel was not appointed, likely would not know the proper phrasing of
questions that would eliminate death-voting jurors while retaining potential life-
voting jurors.0 9 Because of the importance of voir dire in capital cases, attorneys
appointed as standbycounsel need standards that detail the extent to which they
can aid the pro se defendant without violating the defendant's Faretta rights.
B. Mitizaon
The second way capital cases differ from other criminal cases is that in
capital cases evidence in mitigation and aggravation is presented following
conviction but before sentencing. As illustrated bycases like Bkon capital trials
typicallyproceed through two stages: a guilt/innocence phase and a sentencing
phase."0 During sentencing, the prosecution puts on evidence of aggravating
factors that, if proven, increase the potential penalty from life to death and the
defense is given the opportunityto present mitigating evidence to tryto persuade
the jurythat there are reasons that the death penalty should not be imposed."'
Because this is the final chance that the defendant will have to showthe jurythat
he possesses characteristics, qualities, and life circumstances that weigh in favor
of a sentence of life imprisonment rather than death, having assistance in the
presentation of mitigating evidence is critical. Thus, this opportunityto present
mitigating evidence to the jury becomes crucial to a "just" verdict and to the
preservation of the judicial system's integrity."'
As seen in Bkon a capital defendant who represents himself pro se and
refuses to present evidence in mitigation of the offense denies the jury the
107. Id
108. Id
109. Jury selection experts have assisted trial attorneys with selecting favorable juries. These
experts understand the complexityof unraveling jurors' views. The existence of these experts serves
to re-emphasize the undertakings of a pro se defendant. Se gpeaUy JEFFERY T. FREDERICK,
MASTERING VOIR DIRE AND JURY SELECTION: GAINING AN EDGE IN QUESTIONING AND
SELECrING AJURY (American Bar Association 1995).
110. See Blomr 774 P.2d at 702, 709 (containing the headings that divide the court's opinion
into the guilt and penaltyphases of the trial).
111. Sae eg, VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4 (vfichie 2000) (containing procedures for the
sentencing proceeding).
112. See; egWiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 (2003) (stating that if the jury had been
p resented with a more complete picture of mitigating evidence the probability that the jury could
have returned a different result increased); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) (stating that
counsel's limited investigation of mitigating evidence could not be justified as a tactical decision).
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chance to hear a full evaluation of his social history. A defendant who proceeds
pro se during the sentencing phase of his trial could find it difficult to present
his own mitigating evidence. Mitigation evidence often includes pre-trial mental
status, evidence of IQ and low or sub-average intelligence, and evidence of a
rotten social history. A defendant exercising his Famtra rights will not likely be
able to put on evidence effectively or completely of a troubled family life. This
evidence could include such things as family physical and mental abuse, drug
usages by family members, illegal activities performed by family members and
friends in and around the home, and a host of other topics the defendant might
wish to leave partiallyor completelyunexposed. In capital murder trials, mitiga-
tion specialists are hired to aid the defense team in the proper investigation,
analysis, and presentation of mitigating evidence. Because of the considerable
time and energy it takes to prepare a mitigation case, and the fact that capital
defenders identify and employ these specialists themselves, it is unlikely that a
defendant could prepare an equally strong mitigation case on his own. 3
VI. Stanky Comd in Vtima and Po Se Doniaz in the capil Cctext
If history is any indicator of future events, then it is clear that capital
defendants in Virginia are ill-advised to proceed pro se in their own defense.'
Included in the list of capital defendants who proceeded pro se are Joseph
O'Dell, who was convicted of capital murder and executed onJuly23,1997, and
Richard Townes, who was convicted of capital murder and executed on January
23, 1996.1 While standby counsel were appointed in both cases, it is not clear
what level of involvement standby counsel had in the respective trials." 6 How-
ever, if given guidance on the issue, one would not be forced to speculate if
standbycounsel did all they could within the limits of the lawto aid their respec-
tive defendants.
113. SgavMyDaniel L. Payne, Bukg the Cs efrL Muitiiz Speaiistas a Nessityard
a Matter cRi b 16 CAP. DEF. J. 43 (2003) (explaining the role and importance of a mitigation
specialist and the constitutional and statutory authority in Virginia mandating that a specialist be
appointed when requested in a capital case).
114. Kerry Dougherty, History Shos Muhammd Has Pideei a Bad Lawtrr, THE VIRGINIAN-
PILOT, Oct. 21,2003, at B1, xataiteat 2003 WL 60261710.
115. VIRGINIANSFORALTERNATIVESTOTHEDEATHPENALTYEXECJJIONIFORMATION,
at http://www.vadp.org/exinfo.htm (on file with author) (last visited Feb. 2, 2004).
116. See g=mmy OMDell v. Commonwealth, 364 S.E.2d 491 (Va. 1988) (affirming O'Dell's
conviction and sentence); Townes v. Commonwealth, 362 SE.2d 650 (Va. 1987) (affirming
Townes's conviction and sentence).
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A. Rigt to Caazd in V zmia
The Virginia Constitution does not have language that directlyspeaks to the
right of the accused to have any assistance of trial counsel."' However, an
implied right to counsel was articulated in Banes v Cirvrmoaldt,"' in which the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that "[e]very person convicted of [a] crime has
a constitutional right to have counsel to aid him in making his defense, but no
one is compelled to have counsel."" 9 Later, in Watkim C zrmnaz th,"2° the
court reaffirmed its holding from Banes and stated that the right to counsel was
"fundamental... one of the rights guaranteed to an accused under our Bill of
Rights."I
21
In defining appointed counsel's obligation to an indigent criminal defen-
dant, the Supreme Court of Virginia stated that appointed counsel's "service
should be of such character 'as to preserve the essential integrity of the proceed-
ings as a trial in a court of justice.' "2 The Supreme Court of Virginia has not
articulated rules and procedures different from those announced in Faretta and
McKaskle as it relates to standby counsel's affirmative role and obligations. It
would seem that standby counsel should be held to the same standard of pre-
paredness as appointed or privately obtained counsel
117. VA. CONS. art. I, §8 (Mlchie 2000). The Virginia Constitution states:
That in criminal prosecutions a man bath a right to demand the cause and nature of
his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses, and to call for
evidence in his favor, and he shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial j.uryof his vicinage, without whose unammous consent he cannot be found
.uilt. He shall not be depiived of life or liberty, except by the law of the land or the
Judgment of his peers, nor be compelled in aqy criminal proceeding to give evidence
against himself, nor be put twce in jeopardy for the same offense.
Laws maybe enactedproviding for the tri2l of offenses not felonious by a court not
of record without a jury, preservag" the right of the accused to an appeal to and a
by jury m some court of record hiving original criminal jurisdiction. Laws may also
provide for juries consisting of less than twelve, but not less than five, for the tial of
offenses not felonious, and mayclassifysuch cases, and prescribe the number of jurors
for each class.
In criminal cases, the accused mayplead guilty. If the accused plead not gui.ty, he
may, with his consent and the concurrence ofthe attorney for the Commonwealth and
of the court entered of record, be tried by a smaller number of jurors, or waive a jury.
In case of such waiver or plea of gu i the court shall try the case.
The provisions of this section shabe self-execuung.
Id
118. 23 S.E. 784 (Va. 1895).
119. Barnes v. Commonwealth, 23 S.E. 784, 787 (Va. 1895).
120. 6 S.E.2d 670 (Va. 1940).
121. Watins v. Commonwealth, 6 S.E.2d 670, 671 (Va. 1940); sm Cottrell v. Commonwealth,
46 S.E.2d 413, 417 (Va. 1948) (stating the court's jurisprudence on assistance of counsel.
122. Whitleyv. CGningham, 135 S.E.2d 823, 828 (Va. 1964) (quoting United States ex reL
Weber v. Ragen, 176 F.2d 579, 586 (7th Cr. 1949)).
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B. Mid- Trial Issue qof Cnpemy
What are standby counsel supposed to do when a pro se defendant does
not want to present mitigating evidence in the penaltyphase of a capital murder
trial? This question raises complex issues of ethics and justice.' In Virginia, the
Virginia State Bar Ethics Council states that retained and appointed trial counsel
must honor a defendant's wishes even though this has the likelihood of resulting
in death."'4 However, a tenable argument can be made that standbycounsel are
not under the same ethical restrictions as appointed or retained counsel. Addi-
tionally, one could argue that anycapital defendant who seeks death is incompe-
tent.
In Virginia, the trial court, the prosecution, and the defense have an obliga-
tion before the end of the trial to bring issues relating to the defendant's compe-
tencyto the court's attention.12 When a competency issue is raised, an evalua-
tion is conducted, and the trial court must determine whether the defendant is
mentally competent to stand trial.126 Added complexity appears when a pro se
defendant actively seeks to forfeit his life and counsel has been relegated to the
role of standby counsel. In order to preserve the defendant's appearance of
control before the jury, a motion for a competency evaluation should be made
outside the jury's presence.'27 However, McKaskle warns that although standby
counsel will not undermine the defendant's appearance of self-representation if
proceedings occur outside the presence of the jury, the court is obligated to
resolve disputes between standby counsel and the pro se defendant "in the
defendant's favor whenever the matter is one that would normally be left to the
discretion of counsel.""' One could posit that in the interests of justice, any
person with knowledge or reason to believe that a defendant in the criminal
justice system is incompetent should be able to bring this issue to the court's
attention. If one takes this position, then standby counsel would not be acting
in violation of the defendant's Farntta right by raising a competency issue, but
rather standby counsel would be acting in the interests of justice.
123. SeLinda E. Carter, Mai.nu S~tt,iceimq I, Gital Gose: The Useqf CZW.ApPdMoi
Cae.'nd wtohmetMm zidi~ E xWhn teDef mtdA&AdWaW Doeth, 55 TENN. L. REV. 95, 148
(1987) (arguing that because of the finality of death in capital cases, it is in the best interest of
judicial integrity to appoint an attorney to present mitigating evidence when the capital defendant
affirmatively seeks death).
124. Va. Legal Ethics Opinion, Fornal Op. 1737 (Michie 2002). S&,naly Eisenberg, supra
note 93, at 63 (outlining ethical and other issues for retained and appointed defense counsel when
defendants affirmatively seek death).
125. VA. CODE ANN. §19.2- 169.1 (Michie 2003) (setting forthprocedures forraising questions
of competency to stand trial or to plead).
126. Id
127. See Mdaskle, 465 U.S. at 178 (stating that standby counsel should not be allowed to
destroy the jury's perception of the pro se defendant).
128. Id at 179.
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An alternative to standbycounsel raising the competencyissue would be for
the court to appoint amicus curiae to present mitigation evidence to the jury if
a pro se capital defendant seeks death.[2 By appointing an impartial third-party
to present mitigation evidence in the interest of the court, possible loyalty and
role conflicts could be avoided 30 However, appointing amicus curiae could
result in complex problems of logistics and impartiality. If the court calls
witnesses in mitigation, then the court no longer appears neutral in front of the
jury."' Additionally, the time it takes to investigate and prepare mitigation
evidence for a capital crime is substantial, and pro se capital defendants might
not voice their plan to pursue death until the guilt/innocence phase is com-
pleted.' The interests of society, when examined against the possible pitfalls
of appointing amicus curiae, weigh in favor of appointment. Although unusual,
appointment would ensure the jury has all the relevant information to make a
"just" decision while still preserving the appearance of a traditional adversary
trial.
133
Another variation of the complex issues that arise when examining standby
counsel and death-seeking pro se defendants can be seen in Appe v Horn'3 4 In
Appel, a capital defendant filed a federal habeas petition claiming a violation of
his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel when he was assigned public
defenders and then asked the court to allow him to waive his right to counsel. 3
The court ordered a competencyhearing before ruling on the motion.'36 Coun-
sel did nothing to investigate competency nor did they look for any evidence
before the competency hearing took place.3 7 Counsel thought they were under
129. S&Carter, sup' note 123, at 148. Pro se defendants potentialycould raise Constitutional
challenges to the appointment of amicus counsel, and claim their Sixth Amendment right to defend
themselves as theywished had been violated. Se U.S. Coast. amend. VI (stating "[iln all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to... have the assistance of counsel for his de-
fence").
130. Se Carter, s"-a note 123, at 148.
131. Idat 149.
132. Id at 150.
133. Idat 151.
134. No. CIV. A 97-2809, 1999 W 323805, at *1 (ED. Pa. May21, 1999).
135. Appel v. Horn, No. aV. A. 97-2809, 1999 WL 323805, at *1, *2 (ED. Pa. May 21,
1999).
136. Id
137. Id at *3. Both counsel affirmed at Appel's Post Conviction Relief Act hearing that
neither had, in the time between Appel's entry of appearance and his hearing to establish compe-
tencyto waive counsel (10 days), attempted to secure Appel's military history, employment record,
or any other record regarding Appel Id at *3 n.8. Additionally, counsel asserted that Appel
instructed them not to contact family members and made it clear that he did not authorize them
to act as his attorneys. Id at *3 n.9. Believing that they must be his attorneys to investigate
defenses, counsel did nothing. Id
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no obligation to investigate competency because the defendant had made a
request to proceed pro se.' Counsel asserted that they believed they would
then be appointed as standbycounsel.'39 Counsel interpreted this request bythe
defendant to proceed pro se to mean that theywere no longer appointed counsel
and were not under an obligation to take any affirmative steps toward preparing
any aspect of the defendant's case before the competencyhearing.'" The court
granted the habeas petition because the defendant effectively had no counsel
prior to the competency hearing, which ultimately resulted in the court allowing
him to represent himself, to plead guilty, and to receive the death penalty.1
4
1
Because of counsel's confusion with respect to the role of standbycounsel, what
activates the role, and what obligations the role of standby counsel entails,
Appel's writ of habeas corpus was granted and a new trial was ordered.
4
1
In Appd, the competency issue arose before trial, and counsel's confusion
ultimatelycaused the need for a retrial. 43 Thus,Appdillustrates the considerable
confusion that surrounds self-representation and standby counsel even before
the penalty phase of a capital trial. This case makes clear the need for guidance
by the courts and legislature in defining standby counsel's affirmative duties,
roles, and limitations.
C Voir Die
The Virginia Constitution provides the right to an impartial jury both
during guilt/innocence and during the sentencing phase of a trial.1" During voir
dire, the court and counsel for both the Commonwealth and the defense have
the right to question potential jurors under oath.4 ' At the time of questioning,
138. Id at *3.
139. Id at *3 n.8.
140. Id at *3. The court noted that a competency hearing is a "critical stage" in the prosecu-
tion of a criminal defendant, and as a "critical stage" the defendant is entitled to the assistance of
counseL Id at *8; seeao Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (stating that a proceeding is a
"critical stage" if" 'potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights'" could occur because of
the absence of trial counsel's presence (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,227 (1967))).
141. Appd, 1999 WL 323805, at *15.
142. Id at *17.
143. Id at "15, *17.
144. VA. CONST. art. 1 S 8 (stating "[t)hat in criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to ...
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of his vicinage, without whose
unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty"). SeegaUtryMartin v. Commonwealth, 271 S.E.2d
123,129 (Va. 1980) (stating that the defendant has a constitutional right to an impartial jury); Justus
v. Commonwealth, 266 S.E.2d 87, 90 (Va. 1980) (standing for the same proposition); Gosling v.
Commonwealth, 376 S.E.2d 541, 543 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) (standing for the same proposition).
145. VA. CODE ANN. 5 8.01-358 (vlichie 2000) (stating the procedures for voir dire examina-
tion of potential jurors); VA. SUP. CT. R- 3A14(a)(7) (2004) (stating that the court must question
prospective jurors to determine if there is "reason to believe [the juror] might not give a fair and
impartial trial to the Commonwealth and the accused").
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counsel for both the Commonwealth and the defense can ask if the potential
juror "has expressed or formed any opinion, or is sensible of any bias or preju-
dice" as to guilt and, equally as important in a capital case, as to sentence."
While there is no limitation on the number of "for cause" challenges, such
challenges must be made immediately on one of the four grounds listed in
section 8.01-358 of the Virginia Code.
47
In a Virginia capital case, the goal of voir dire is to obtain twenty-five jurors
who have survived challenges for cause."' Assuming twenty five potential jurors
are left, typicallyboth the Commonwealth and the defense will have five peremp-
tory strikes to utilize, which leaves a jury that consists of twelve members and
three alternates. Capital defense attorneys, therefore, must seat a jury with nine
"life-jurors" in order to ensure that one "life-juror" will be placed in the seated
jury.49 When utilizing peremptory strikes, both the prosecution and defense are
subject to the limitations pronounced in Batson v K &ntu and its progeny.'51
Considerable law also surrounds the denial by the court of defense chal-
lenges for cause. For example, the defense is required to object twice to the
seating of a juror in order to avoid procedural default.52 Defense counsel must
first object when the judge refuses to dismiss the juror for cause and then
defense counsel must object again when the jury is sworn. 3
146. VA. CODE ANN. S 8.01-358; sw Green v. Commonwealh, 580 S.E.2d 834,845 (Va. 2003)
(stating that "[a] prospective juror is properly excused for cause when that person's views concern-
ing the death penalty would substantially impair or preclude the performance of his or her duty in
accordance with the court's instructions and the juror's oath"); Green v. Commonwealth, 546
S.E.2d 446, 451-52 (Va. 2001) (holding that Virginia Code S 8.01-358 includes questions about
sentencing impartialityin capital trials); Patterson v. Cmmonwealth, 283 S.E.2d 212,215 (Va. 1981)
(requiring jurors to be impartial as to punishment).
147. Additionally, counsel in Virginia can strike a juror for cause if it is discovered that the
potential juror is related within the ninth degree of consanguinityor affinityto either the defendant
orthe victim. Grayv. Commonwealth, 311 S.E.2d 409,410 (Va. 1984) (citingJaques v. Common-
wealth, 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) 690 (1853)).
148. The defense needs nine life-jurors inthe finalpoolof twentyfive because the prosecution
could strike five with peremptory strikes and at least three will be alternate jurors.
149. Seesupra note 148.
150. 476 U.s. 79 (1986).
151. SeeBatson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (stating that utilizing peremptory strikes
for race based discrimination is prohibited); seealsoJ.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1994)
(prohibiting peremptory strikes based on gender).
152. SegaradayBeavers v. Commonwealth, 427 S.E.2d 411,418-19 (Va. 1993) (stating that
because "Beavers did not object at the time the trial court excused each of the three individual
[venire persons] for cause" he "waived any objections he had to the exclusion for cause of these
three jurors").
153. See VA. SuP. Cr. R. 5:25 (2004) (stating that "[e]rror will not be sustained to any ruling
of the trial court or the commission before which the case was initially tried unless the objection
was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to
enable this Court to attain the ends of justice"); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 785, 793
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The preceding paragraphs serve to illustrate a portion of the substantial
volume of law that surrounds capital voir dire. Because of the life or death
magnitude of a capital trial and the extremely precise rules governing, among
other things, procedural default, standbycounsel should be mandatoryin capital
cases. A pro se capital defendant with little to no legal training would surely
expose himself to considerable error if an experienced attorneycould not guide
him through the process. Standby counsel should consult frequently with a
defendant who asks for aid to ensure that the defendant has a grasp of the issues
and implications of voir dire procedures. Such discussions would take place
outside of the presence of the jury, as a juryhas yet to be selected. Additionally,
because capital voir dire is often done individuallyor in small groups, the relative
effect of consultation between the pro se defendant and standby counsel would
be minimized. Standbycounsel should make everyeffort to assist the defendant
in asking relevant questions, spotting potential Batson issues, and preserving
denials of for-cause strikes for appeal.
In a situation in which the pro se defendant may consult with standby
counsel but chooses not to, an argument can be made that counsel does have the
ability and obligation to communicate with the defendant about what motions
and strikes to make. Standby counsel can communicate instructions to the pro
se defendant before the potential jurors are present, give subtle instructions to
the pro se defendant during voir dire- so long as his aid was not specifically
denied- and play a role in assuring that motions made during voir dire are
handled properly to avoid procedural default. As established, voir dire is a
critical stage of a criminal trial and therefore standby counsel should be able to
give advice to the defendant."4 This communication can be made outside the
presence of the jurors to avoid interfering with how the jury perceives the pro
se defendant."'
D. Miiguon
The importance of presenting mitigating evidence in capital cases cannot
be underestimated. The United States Supreme Court has held that capital
defendants are entitled to present evidence in mitigation during the penaltyphase
(Va. 1989) (stating that "[i]f a party objects to rulings made during the voir dire of a prospective
juror, but subsequendy fails to object to the seating of that juror, the party has waived the voir dire
objections").
154. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 873 (1989) (affirming that voir dire is a critical
stage in a felony triaD; sw also Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (plurality
opinion) (stating that "[oir dim plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that his
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be honored"); Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 367
S.E.2d 176, 180 (Va. Ct. App. 1988) (standing for the same proposition).
155. Maskle, 465 U.S. at 179.
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of a capital trial.15' Courts provide such strong protection for mitigation because
it serves as another procedural safeguard to ensure a "just" determination of
sentencing. When a defendant decides to proceed pro se, the same issues
respecting the pro se defendant's knowledge of the law, abilityto make motions
in a timely manner, and preserve issues for appeal, arise in mitigation as in voir
dire. When standby counsel properly assumes the "at the read)!' model of
representation, standby counsel should be preparing for the defendant's mitiga-
tion case prior to trial and as the trial progresses, in fight of the pro se defen-
dant's defensive strategy. This level of preparation is a heavy but necessary
burden on standby counsel. As discussed in the context of Bioni standby
counsel and the court are put in awkward positions when a pro se defendant
refuses to present mitigating evidence."5 7 The court may appoint standby
counsel as amicus curiae or order a competencyre-evaluation before the sentenc-
ing phase if no mitigating evidence will be offered.5 8
Additionally, in Virginia, standby counsel placed in the situation of having
a pro se defendant refuse to offer mitigating evidence can utilize section 19.2-
264.5 of the Virginia Code in order, ultimately, to have mitigating evidence
considered before a death sentence is accepted. Section 19.2-264.5 states:
156. St; eg, Wli , 529 U.S. at 396 (stating that because defense counsel did not uncover
substantial mitigating evidence, they"did not fulfilltheir obligation to conduct a thorough investiga-
tion of the defendant's background"); Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 276 (1998) (stating
"that the sentencer may not be precluded from considering, and may not refuse to consider, any
constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence"); McCleskeyv. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305-06 (1987)
(concluding that a constitutional death penalty scheme must allow a sentencer to consider anyand
all relevant materials and circumstances that could result in the sentencer declining to punish the
accused with death); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (holding that during the
sentencing phase, counsel must make reasonable investigations and arrive at reasonable conclusions
when determining what investigations are unnecessar); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114
(1982) (holding that a sentencer maynot "refuse to consider, as a manerfqla anyrelevant mitigat-
ing evidence"); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (holding "testimony... highly relevant
to a critical issue in the punishment phase of the trial" cannot be excluded based on Georgia's
hearsayrule); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,604 (1978) (plurafity) (arguing that both the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments preclude a sentencer from being unable to consider, as mitigating
evidence, any evidence or circumstances of the accused's character or record that could result in a
sentence less than death); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (stating "that in
capital cases the fundamental respect for humanityunderlying the Eighth Amendment... requires
consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the
particular offense as a constitutionallyindispensable part of the process of inflicting the penaltyof
death" (citation omitted)). Sw gmfaUy Payne, supra note 113, at 43 (explaining the role and
importance of a mitigation specialist and the constitutional and statutory authority in Virginia
mandating that a specialist be appointed upon request in a capital case).
157. Seesup notes 87-96 and accompanying text (examining the problems associated with
a pro se defendant's refusal to present mitigating evidence).
158. S supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text (discussing the appointment of amicus
curiae in a capital case).
2004]
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
When the punishment of anyperson has been fixed at death the court
shall, before imposing sentence, direct a probation officer o? the court
to thoroughly investigate the history of the defendant and any and all
other relevant facts, to the end that the court may be fully advised as
to whether the sentence of death is appropriate and just. Reports shall
be made, presented and filed as provided in S 19.2-299 except that,
notwithstanding any other provision of law, such reports shall in all
cases contain a Victim Impact Statement. Such statement shall con-
tain the same information and be prepared in the same manner as
Victim Impact Statements prepared pursuant to 5 19.2-299.1. After
consideration of the report, and upon good cause shown, the court
may set aside the sentence of death and impose a sentence of impris-
onment for life." 9
Because 19.2-264.5 requires the post-sentence report to contain evidence of the
defendant's history, if standby counsel has adequately prepared and compiled
materials for a mitigation case, these documents can be given to the probation
officer to aid him in the compilation of the post-sentence report." If the pro
se defendant does not want any mitigating evidence presented and refuses
standby counsel's assistance, the judge could order the probation officer to
consult with standby counsel. If substantial mitigation appears in the post-
sentence report and the judge determines that the defendant's failure to allow
standbycounsel to aid in the presentation of mitigation evidence is "good cause
shown," section 19.2-264.5 allows the court to set aside a sentence of death




The courts should adopt, and standby counsel should proceed under, the
role of standby counsel "at the ready." Implicit in this posture is constant
preparation to assume the role of counsel if requested by the defendant or
required by the court. Because of the stakes of a capital murder trial and the
possibly deadly consequences, a defendant's competency and knowing and
inteligent waiver of his right to counsel should be consistently monitored.
Additionally, added procedural safeguards should be considered in the areas of
voir dire and presentation of mitigating evidence. By making the presentation
of mitigation evidence mandatory and assuring that an impartial juryis selected,
these safeguards will help to ensure that the criminal justice system's integrity is
159. VA. CODE ANN. 519.2-264.5 (Michie 2000).
160. See i (requiring a probation officer "to throughly investigate the history of the defen-
dant").
161. Se id ("After consideration of the report, and upon good cause shown, the court may
set aside the sentence of death and impose a sentence of imprisonment for life.").
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not compromised by a pro se defendant's choice to proceed relying on his own
representational skill.
The obligations and limitations of standbycounsel are not clearly defined.
Absent clearer roles, standby counsel are left to proceed acting under the mini-
mal guidance articulated in McKaskle. McKaskle provides some guidance, but
does not clearly articulate the obligations of standby counsel in a criminal trial.
With several variations of the "role" standbycounsel should playin assisting- or
not assisting- pro se defendants, but no national, and in most cases no jurisdic-
tional standards, standby counsel and the pro se defendants are proceeding at
their own peril. When the criminal trial is capital, this lack of statutory and case
law guidance jeopardizes the criminal justice system.

